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Abstract 
The KIVCET and the zinc roaster plants at Trail perform major maintenance shutdowns 
to ensure safe and reliable production. These events are very resource intensive and have a 
significant impact on production. Previous shutdowns have resulted in significant safety, hygiene, 
and environmental difficulties. Effective management of these events is important to the success 
of Trail Operations. In this paper, I analyze existing practices to identify some of the major 
problems that impede performance. I then provide a number of recommendations to improve 
shutdown management at Trail based on recognized best practice. This paper concludes with an 
implementation plan that is performed by shutdown practitioners and plant management, working 
under the guidance of a senior level steering committee. 
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1: Introduction 
Teck Metals Ltd. operates one of the world‟s largest fully integrated zinc and lead 
smelting and refining complexes in Trail, British Columbia. Major maintenance shutdowns are 
required at the KIVCET lead smelter and the zinc roaster plants to achieve safe and reliable 
production. These shutdowns are very resource intensive and have a significant impact on 
production. Previous shutdowns have resulted in major safety, hygiene and environmental 
difficulties that have prompted subsequent improvements to shutdown management practices at 
Trail. 
This paper examines the current state of shutdown management in both areas through the 
full shutdown management cycle of planning, execution and follow-up. This paper identifies the 
important role of the equipment integrity teams at the smelter, and demonstrates their significant 
contribution to achieving improved shutdown performance. The paper summarizes shutdown 
management practices and identifies problems and opportunities.  
Based on this situation, I recommend establishing a common approach to shutdown 
management under the guidance of a steering committee, with specific solutions implemented by 
shutdown practitioners and plant management. I present an implementation plan for achieving 
best practice using concepts for effective organizational transformation defined by Kotter (2007).  
To achieve these aims, the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews and analyzes 
current shutdown practices at Trail, and identifies key issues to address. Chapter 3 presents 
recommendations to address the issues identified. Chapter 4 uses the Kotter (2007) model to 
explain how to implement the recommendations.  
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2: Shutdown Maintenance at Trail 
This chapter provides a review and analysis of existing shutdown maintenance activities 
at the Trail metallurgical facility. This review introduces the reader to the shutdown management 
process and highlights performance gaps. The final section identifies and substantiates four major 
problems impeding shutdown management performance at Trail.  
2.1 Trail Overview 
Trail Operations, located in British Columbia, is one of the world‟s largest fully 
integrated zinc and lead smelting and refining complexes. The metallurgical operations produce 
refined zinc and lead as well as sixteen additional products including precious metals, specialty 
metals, chemicals and fertilizer products. Ongoing high transportation costs associated with 
Trail‟s inland location, and high labor costs, have resulted in a high focus on efficient operating 
practices to ensure economic operation. 
Maintenance activities are a key component of ensuring economic operation by achieving 
high equipment availability and operating rates. Associated costs comprise a significant portion 
of the Trail Operations routine and capital budgets. Management of planned maintenance 
shutdowns comprises a significant component of the total site maintenance cost. Specifically, 
major shutdowns of the KIVCET furnace and the zinc roaster operations have significant impact 
to the bottom line for Trail Operations. Not only are these shutdowns costly in terms of direct 
costs, but there is the lost opportunity due to production downtime. A high level of planning and 
coordination is required to ensure maximum effectiveness of these shutdowns. 
2.2 Types of Maintenance Shutdowns 
Planned plant and equipment shutdowns are required to ensure safe and efficient 
operation. These shutdowns are categorized as opportunity shutdowns, minor maintenance 
shutdowns and major maintenance shutdowns. This section describes the primary purpose of each 
of these shutdowns. 
Opportunity shutdowns are the most common type of shutdown and are of relatively 
short duration. These shutdowns are required to clean process equipment and provide a chance 
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for the plant to perform specific preventative maintenance and minor mechanical repairs that 
require the plant to be out of service. A typical example is the need to clean the radiant section of 
the KIVCET boiler of accumulated accretions by micro blasting every six weeks. Similarly, the 
zinc plant has one of the four cell house units down for cleaning every six weeks. The leaching 
plant schedules opportunity maintenance concurrent with cell house cleaning. Duration of 
opportunity shutdowns varies from 12 hours to three days from one plant to another depending on 
specific requirements. Local contractors supplement regular maintenance crews to maximize 
these maintenance opportunities. 
Minor maintenance shutdowns are larger in scope than opportunity shutdowns. Duration 
of minor maintenance shutdowns is typically four to six days. Minor shutdowns at the zinc 
roasters provide an opportunity to complete a full cleanout of the gas handling system. The zinc 
roasters and the lead smelter typically perform minor shutdowns once or twice every year. As 
with opportunity shutdowns, local contractors supplement the maintenance and service crews to 
minimize shutdown duration. 
Major maintenance shutdowns are significantly larger in scope than opportunity or minor 
shutdowns. These events require a complete cleanout or drainage of process materials, and cool 
down of furnaces to acceptable workplace temperatures, before repair activity can start. Major 
maintenance shutdowns are routinely scheduled in the in the Lead Smelting (LS); and the 
Roasting and Sulphur Products (RSP) business areas as indicated in Table 2.1. These shutdowns 
are mandatory events based on boiler and pressure vessel regulations. Major shutdowns are 
extensive and include large projects that require full access to the process equipment. These large 
projects determine the overall shutdown schedule with all other maintenance activities 
subordinate to them. Typical shutdown projects include furnace rebuilds, major refractory repairs, 
and KIVCET boiler inspection and repair activities. The business area forms a management team 
for these shutdowns, with most of the work completed by contractors. The shutdown management 
team attempts to maximize the use of local contractors. 
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Table 2.1 Standard Major Maintenance Shutdowns at Trail Operations 
 Duration 
(days) 
Shutdown 
Interval (years) 
Direct Cost  
(Cdn $million) 
Lost 
Opportunity 
(Cdn $million) 
LS: KIVCET 30 - 50 3 40 – 60 15 – 25 
RSP:  
#10 Roaster 
10 - 16 2 3 – 6 2 – 3 
RSP: 
 #20 Roaster 
10 – 16 2 3 – 6 2 – 3 
RSP: ZPL 10 – 20 2 2 2 – 3 
RSP: Total 2 2-3 1 2 
Source: author 
2.3 Major Maintenance Shutdown Process 
Each business area at Trail Operations provides preliminary five-year forecasts of 
upcoming major and minor shutdowns. This information forms the basic assumptions used in the 
five-year production forecasts for production and financial planning purposes. These forecasts 
also provide a general framework for overall shutdown coordination within Trail Operations. 
Within the one-year time horizon, the projects group regularly issues updated plant shutdown 
schedules. 
Business area management has full accountability for the planning and execution of plant 
maintenance shutdowns. The full cycle of shutdown management includes scope identification, 
front-end engineering, detailed planning and preparation, shutdown execution, and follow-up. 
The following sections describe the scope and management process for each of these activities. 
The final section provides a case study demonstrating the important ongoing contribution of the 
smelter integrity teams makes to these shutdowns. 
2.3.1 Shutdown Scope Identification 
Defining shutdown scope is the first step in the shutdown management process. A high-
level shutdown scope document is prepared. This document includes a listing of planned 
shutdown projects with primary objectives for each. Shutdown scope is prepared by analyzing 
equipment condition and performance against recognized regulatory and design standards. A 
forward look of predicted future equipment condition is required to ensure reliable operations.  
  5 
The lead smelter has a strong focus on identifying shutdown scope as early as possible. 
Once a major shutdown is completed, the smelter begins to identify the scope for the next major 
shutdown based on recommendations contained in job post mortems and supplied by the smelter 
integrity teams. Shutdown job owners complete post mortems, identifying work not completed to 
original scope and identified additional work based on equipment inspections. Smelter integrity 
groups provide recommendations within six months of completing a shutdown based on a more 
detailed review of furnace and boiler condition. The boiler-integrity group recommendations 
include a recommended scope of work, as well as required timing for the next shutdown. 
Once the lead smelter has developed its comprehensive shutdown scope and the timing 
for the next shutdown, plant management meets with Trail and corporate senior management 
groups to ensure understanding and endorsement of the shutdown plan at an early stage. These 
meetings are required because of the large direct cost and the significant production impact of 
KIVCET shutdowns. This communication has also proven to be helpful in ensuring the necessary 
support throughout the Trail and corporate organizations.  
The roaster group identifies shutdown scope for the upcoming year as part of the budget 
planning cycle. Plant engineers define scope based on previously documented shutdown 
inspection results as well as regulatory requirements and input from plant personnel. This 
approach is highly dependent of the knowledge and skill of individual engineers.  
Plant personnel in both areas define additional scope of work and projects for upcoming 
shutdowns during the course of routine plant operations. A systematic method of managing 
additions to shutdown scope in a controlled manner is required. In the smelter, the integrity 
groups manage this function; while in the roasters, plant management must approve any additions 
to scope. 
2.3.2 Shutdown Front-End Engineering 
Front-end engineering includes all activities required to build up the high-level scope 
items into work packages that the shutdown team can use to prepare for the next shutdown. 
Engineers work with plant operating and maintenance personnel, engineering supply and design 
companies, and contractors, to identify how to implement the identified shutdown projects, while 
ensuring adherence to regulatory and Teck internal standards.  
In-plant engineering personnel lead the front-end engineering activities for all shutdown 
projects. They review available information and meet with plant personnel to develop a detailed 
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project scope. The engineers then perform or outsource engineering activities to detail practical 
aspects of the work including equipment supply, materials and work procedures. The front-end 
engineers review proposed plans with subject matter experts to ensure they address the original 
project objectives. Following this, they perform risk assessments with mitigating strategies 
identified to address high hazard issues. These activities culminate in preparation of a work 
package that include  budget cost, schedule, scope, resource requirements, material specifications, 
procurement activities, quality assurance requirements, work procedures, and risk mitigation for 
each job. 
Typically, there is more than sufficient time available to complete shutdown front-end 
engineering activities; however due to other duties for the engineers, this activity often becomes a 
bottleneck in the shutdown management process. Both the smelter (Marsh, 2011) and the roaster 
organizations have identified this difficulty. This became less critical for the smelter in 2010 due 
to the decision to defer the shutdown from April to October. The roaster organization has created 
and uses a simple spreadsheet to track front-end engineering activities against key milestones, and 
enables management intervention to occur in a timely manner. The roaster organization would 
benefit by earlier shutdown scope definition. 
2.3.3 Shutdown Planning and Preparation 
Shutdown planning and preparation includes the activities required to compile shutdown 
work packages, plant maintenance, and utility requirements into a shutdown team ready to 
manage and coordinate all shutdown activities. This includes defining the organizational team, 
communication and reporting structures, procurement, schedule, overall budget, cost controls, 
and detailed work plans. 
At the smelter, the shutdown manager manages planning and preparation. This individual 
is a member of the Trail Projects group and manages execution of the portfolio of major projects 
in the lead business units between shutdowns. While managing these projects, he allots about 10 
to 20% of his time to prepare for the next major shutdown. He ensures specific requirement are 
recognized and well defined. The incumbent provides necessary influence to ensure front-end 
engineering and major procurement activities stay on track.  
The smelter shutdown manager meets with the lead-smelter operating manager a year 
prior to the shutdown to establish the final scope of work for the shutdown, including input from 
the utility groups. The shutdown scope of work, together with information contained in the work 
packages form the basis for determining the specific shutdown organizational structure, the 
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overall shutdown project schedule, and total shutdown budget cost. The shutdown organizational 
structure is then used to select individual team members for various roles based on demonstrated 
experience and potential employee development opportunities.  
With the organizational structure in place, the shutdown manager defines specific roles 
and associated responsibilities for each position in a formal document. All shutdown team 
members receive training to ensure a common understanding of the identified roles and 
responsibilities. The smelter shutdown manager schedules additional skill training to ensure all 
shutdown personnel are fully capable of working to defined expectations. 
Job owners receive work packages developed by the front-end engineers. Job owners 
work with smelter personnel to identify specific shutdown project requirements. Plant personnel 
then prepare detailed procedures for plant shutdown, equipment isolations and preparations, and 
start-up requirements. Strong systems are in place to complete comprehensive hazard risk 
assessments (HRA) for all aspects of every project. Overlapping hazards with other projects are 
resolved at this stage. This information is provided to contractors who build on this information to 
develop detailed safe work plans, schedules, and budgets. 
Normally this approach has provided satisfactory results; however, this was not the case 
in 2010. Safety, health and environmental specialists were not available in a timely manner 
(Marsh, 2011) to provide necessary input to the planning process. This caused a significant delay 
in providing necessary safety requirements to contractors, and thus they had very little time to 
prepare safe work plans for their employees. There was insufficient contractor involvement in the 
shutdown planning process (Kniel, 2010). A better approach is to ensure contractors routinely 
participate in the Teck risk assessment process to build a common understanding of the 
significant risks and to develop safe work plans based on practical experience. 
Contractor capacity to develop their detailed safe work plans is variable. Contractors well 
familiar with specific jobs began work with weak safe work plans (Marsh, 2011). The shutdown 
management team assesses contractor capacity following each shutdown to assist in determining 
which contractors to work with in subsequent shutdowns. An important challenge is to build local 
contractor capacity to achieve optimum shutdown performance while minimizing shutdown costs. 
This is also an effective contribution to the local economy. 
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Figure 2.1  Typical KIVCET Planning and Execution Cycle for Major Shutdowns 
 
Source: author 
 
The Trail purchasing group works with the smelter shutdown manager to develop 
procurement plans. Monthly meetings begin about one year prior to the shutdown to identify 
critical procurement needs. The purchasing group prepares and maintains a master procurement 
list visible to all to ensure transparency on deliveries. Sufficient time is available to allow for 
competitive bidding; negotiation of terms and conditions for risk management purposes; 
discounts for early payment; elimination of restocking fees; and optimization of transportation 
arrangements. An estimated 5% cost saving is achieved by effective integration of the purchasing 
department in the smelter shutdown planning process. An essential deliverable of shutdown 
procurement activities is to ensure all materials arrive on time to meet shutdown requirements. 
This process has resulted in a significant improvement in on-time delivery for shutdown 
materials. 
Many small maintenance activities require the plant to be shutdown; however, the 
planning process for these activities is very different from the large shutdown projects. The 
smelter maintenance group plans these jobs within the constraints imposed by the major 
shutdown project and identifies requirements for supplemental personnel. The smelter 
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maintenance superintendent reports to the smelter shutdown manager during the major shutdown 
event.  
With up to 800 shutdown contractors on-site everyday during the shutdown, detailed 
plans are developed for many activities including communications, employee inductions, 
security, parking, locker assignments and change rooms, supply of specialized personal protective 
equipment, on-site buses, lunchrooms, and janitorial services. Support groups recognize the 
importance of effective shutdown management and provide the necessary assistance to deliver the 
necessary support. When support groups are not able to provide necessary assistance, they 
identify these constraints in a timely manner and the shutdown team identifies alternative 
solutions.  
The roaster organization applies a similar approach to shutdown planning and 
preparation; however, the scope of shutdown activities is much smaller and planning occurs in a 
much shorter period. The roaster shutdown coordinator functions as the shutdown manager for 
the major shutdowns. There is much less coordination with purchasing than occurs in smelter 
shutdowns. This leads to higher costs and more problems such as late delivery of shutdown 
supplies. Contractors participate in the hazard risk assessments with the job owners and front-end 
engineers when practical.  
In 2009-10, the roaster maintenance group handed over responsibility for routine 
preventative and repair maintenance occurring during a shutdown to the roaster shutdown team. 
This lack of understanding of the difference between the nature of shutdown maintenance 
projects, and maintenance tasks occurring during shutdowns, resulted in overwhelming the 
shutdown planning process. Responsibility for routine maintenance occurring during the 
shutdown has returned to the roaster maintenance group.  
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Figure 2.2 Typical Roaster Planning and Execution Cycle for Major Shutdowns 
 
Source: author 
 
2.3.4 Shutdown Execution 
Shutdown execution is the phase of shutdown management when the shutdown team 
implements the defined projects. This includes pre-shutdown site preparations, process shutdown, 
maintenance shutdown inspection and repair activities, process start-up and shutdown 
demobilization. The worksite becomes very active as numerous contractors come on site. 
Effective communication is essential to ensure all activities are well coordinated. 
A robust reporting structure is required during shutdown execution. To support this 
requirement the shutdown manager reports directly to the lead-smelter operating manager during 
shutdown execution. The project manager has overall responsibility for the full scope of all 
shutdown activities. This responsibility begins when contractors start arriving on-site prior to the 
shutdown to set up temporary offices and to prepare the worksite for planned maintenance 
activities.  
Effective communications are required during shutdown execution. A daily meeting with 
all job owners, essential operators and support staff ensures effective site coordination, 
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management of overlapping hazards, and early identification of any problems. Job owners, crew 
supervisors and crews meet daily to establish effective coordination within each job or work area. 
The shutdown project manager meets daily with members of the Trail senior management group 
to provide a high-level status of projects and review site indicators of safety, health, 
environmental, cost and schedule performance. The shutdown team set up a SharePoint site for 
the 2010 smelter shutdown and achieved further improvement in the quality of information 
sharing between all groups. 
The 2010 shutdown demonstrated a new level of quality management with checkpoints 
defined for each of the major projects. Quality assurance personnel were on site 24 hours a day 
(Marsh, 2011) to perform the necessary checks and give approval to proceed. This group 
inspected all deviations in equipment condition and initiated preparation of revised repair plans. 
This approach to quality ensured strong compliance to defined expectations and allowed job 
owners and contractors to focus on working to plan. 
Strong systems are in place for cost tracking. A central cost centre receives all invoices 
on a daily basis and prepares a daily update of all indicated project costs by 10 o‟clock every 
morning. Job owners review and approve all invoices and then provide daily updates of costs 
incurred to date and estimated final job cost. The shutdown manager reviews overall costs and 
trends on a daily basis and identifies any potential issues to senior management. This approach 
ensures a strong focus on cost management and avoids any surprise in total shutdown cost due to 
contractor delays in submitting invoices. Timely cost tracking also provides an additional benefit 
when working with contractors that provide discounts for early payment of invoices.  
The roaster organization applies a similar approach to shutdown execution. Management 
ensures a strong focus on revisiting plans when there are differences between conditions defined 
in the safe work plans and actual conditions. For example, as soon as a potential mercury hygiene 
issue arose, management stopped work in the mercury removal tower for 81 hours while a 
thorough review of the work was completed. The roaster shutdown team has a significantly 
weaker focus on cost and schedule management than is present at the smelter. Few jobs have 
extensive quality assurance procedures. 
2.3.5 Shutdown Follow Up 
Shutdown follow up activities include site cleanup and evaluation of the shutdown 
experience. Waste disposal activities are essential to preventing future difficulties. An effective 
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post mortem and a formal follow up process are important to achieving continuous improvement 
in shutdown performance. 
Waste disposal is an area of difficulty for all areas. Waste disposal costs have typically 
not been included in scope of work for the shutdown projects (Marsh, 2011). Standards for 
disposing of mercury-contaminated wastes are unclear. There is no clear site ownership of 
shutdown waste management responsibilities. 
Smelter job owners have a defined responsibility to perform job post mortems within two 
weeks of completion of work to ensure effective contractor input. The quality of the post mortems 
is variable depending on the skill level of each of the job owners and is an area for improved 
training in future shutdowns (Marsh, 2011). The shutdown project manager normally compiles a 
comprehensive post-mortem report.  
The roaster organization prepares weak post mortems, and follow up often does not take 
place. The shutdown coordinator lists problems and successes as identified by the shutdown job 
owners; however, there is no analysis of root cause or identification of how to improve future 
performance. Roaster management attributes this deficiency to resource constraints, with several 
shutdowns each year at the roasters. 
2.3.6 Process Equipment Integrity Groups 
The lead smelter has formed two process integrity groups to improve asset management 
of the critical process equipment in response to significant events and equipment concerns. For 
example, the smelter established a boiler integrity group following the February 2004 explosion 
in the KIVCET furnace. These two groups provide technical oversight of the large furnaces and 
boilers in the business area. The following case study of the furnace integrity group illustrates 
how it contributes to improved smelter performance and shutdown management. 
Smelter management established the KIVCET furnace integrity group in response to 
short operating campaigns between major shutdowns. Furnace hearth condition became a major 
worry when the site refractory expert identified a significant risk to the life of the furnace hearth 
because of frequent thermal cycles. This problem was caused by the annual major shutdown of 
the KIVCET furnace. He estimated that these frequent thermal cycles had reduced furnace heath 
life from the original design of twenty-five years to ten years. With an estimated cost of 
$35,000,000 and three-month duration to replace the furnace hearth, change was obviously 
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required. The KIVCET integrity group began to meet on a monthly basis, to document and 
monitor furnace condition. 
After meeting for some time the group set a goal of achieving a four-year operating 
campaign between major shutdowns. This was a major shift from the one-year operating 
campaign of that time. The group completed a detailed review of all furnace components, and 
identified potential risks to the four-year goal. They analyzed numerous options for overcoming 
these risks and developed a recommended approach to increase the length of the furnace 
operating campaign. Early analysis indicated that a four-year campaign would be extremely 
difficult to achieve. As a first step, the integrity group proposed the installation of an additional 
lead top-hole, and specific changes to furnace jacket design at critical locations. With these 
changes, the group proposed a three-year campaign as an interim target.  
The KIVCET furnace now successfully achieves a three-year operating campaign 
between major shutdowns. Condition of the furnace boiler has become the primary constraint to 
achieving longer operating campaigns. Over time, the group has evolved to providing technical 
oversight of all four major furnaces in the lead smelting business area, and taking the lead on 
identifying scope of work for major shutdowns.  
The furnace integrity group manages quality assurance during the smelter shutdown 
including detailed inspection of furnace components. One of the group members compiles all 
results and observations. They then meet following the shutdown to review this information and 
to recommend scope of work for the next shutdown. The group defines this shutdown scope 
within the two months of completing a major shutdown. For example, in 2010 the smelter 
shutdown was completed in November 2010, and before Christmas 2010 the group identified 
scope of work for the 2013 shutdown, and as well as a preliminary scope for the 2016 shutdown. 
With scope in place, front-end engineering for the 2013 shutdown started January 2010. 
2.4 Shutdown Challenges 
The previous sections have introduced the reader to the shutdown maintenance processes 
and practices at Trail. I will now identify and substantiate four major problems to resolve as the 
next step in improving shutdown management performance at Trail. The first two problems are 
specific to the roaster area, and the other two apply to all major shutdowns at Trail. 
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2.4.1 Roaster Shutdown Management Team Capacity 
The shutdown management team at roaster organization lacks the necessary skills and 
experience to manage shutdowns to the expected standard for Trail Operations. Essential to a 
successful shutdown is effective management of workplace safety, environmental performance, 
cost and schedule. Shutdown results over the past two years demonstrate deficiencies in all these 
areas. This section highlights several examples demonstrating these deficiencies. The team 
members themselves are all capable and willing individuals; however, the team as a whole does 
not deliver the necessary results due to insufficient experience and inadequate training. Some 
examples also point to the need for stronger support in the area of health and safety management. 
Teck has defined safety as a core value, believing that all incidents are preventable. 
Safety in the workplace is a guiding principle for Trail Operations “We commit to everyone 
going home safe and healthy every day.” The company has set safety targets of less than 2.1 
reportable incidents and less than 0.5 lost time incidents per 200,000 hours worked. Major roaster 
shutdowns in 2009 and 2010 have not achieved this level of performance. The shutdown team did 
not calculate safety statistics for these shutdowns and thus the author has calculated these 
statistics based on readily available information in order to compare results against company 
targets. 
The October 2009 shutdown of #10 Roaster and #9 Acid Plant had three reportable 
incidents, two of which resulted in lost time. Based on a daily count of contract workers and a 
typical ten-hour working shift, estimated contractor hours worked during the October 2009 
shutdown is 12,400. Safety statistics calculated from this information indicate 48.4 reportable 
incidents, including 32.3 lost time incidents per 200,000 hours worked. These results were well in 
excess of the company targets. 
The first safety incident in the 2009 shutdown occurred on the first day of the shutdown. 
Strong sulphuric acid sprayed onto the face and neck of a pipefitter while he was installing 
isolation blinds. This contractor was off work for several weeks because of this incident and was 
fortunate not to lose his eyesight. The identified cause of this incident was inadequate plant 
procedures to prepare this line for isolation. Recent changes in requirements for process 
equipment isolation had established a requirement to install the blind, and there had been no 
review of potential impacts of this change. The root cause of this incident is the ineffective 
implementation of new job procedures by an inexperienced shutdown management team. 
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The second serious injury was a worker receiving lacerations to his hand due to use of a 
“cheater bar” on a socket wrench. This worker received stitches for the injury and then returned 
to work. The root cause of this incident was the failure of the contractor to work to its own 
defined safe work procedures. Contributing to this incident was the lack of training for the Teck 
job owner. He was not aware of his responsibilities and had not taken adequate steps to prevent 
this incident. 
The third incident was a worker fracturing three toes due to a large precipitator collector 
plate falling onto his foot. The contractor did not recognize the potential hazard associated with 
corrosion at the plate attachment points and thus did not implement preventive measures. The 
Teck job owner had not completed an HRA for this job prior to the shutdown. This incident was 
caused by ineffective shutdown management by a job owner who did not did not understand the 
full scope of his responsibility. 
The shutdown post mortem for the October 2009 shutdown identified that job owners did 
not complete expected job safety audits everyday as expected. This was a disturbing finding, 
especially in light of the very serious incident at the start of the shutdown and a daily reminder to 
all job owners of this requirement. The shutdown manger did not hold job owners accountable to 
meet this standard during the course of the shutdown. The root cause of this problem was an 
inexperienced shutdown manager not fully aware of his responsibilities.  
The October 2010 shutdown of #20 Roaster and #9 Acid Plant had two reportable 
incidents based on a listing of individual incidents. Reportable incidents included a worker with a 
dislocated finger due to falling off stairs and a worker receiving lacerations to his chest due to 
improper use of a mini-grinder. Applying a similar calculation as used for the 2009 shutdown, 
estimated work hours was 30,020 and incident frequency was 13.2. This was a significant 
improvement from 2009 shutdown results; however, these results did not meet the company 
expectations for safety in the workplace. Comparative smelter results for 2007 and 2010 were 2.5 
and 3.0 respectively. 
The above statistics for the 2010 shutdown do not include a very serious high potential 
incident in which a piece of roaster scale fell from the upper section of the roaster and hit the side 
of a worker. Fortunately, the worker was able to return to work after several hours in the hospital 
for medical observations. This incident occurred because the work plan did not include installing 
a safety net in the roaster to protect workers from this type of event. A long-standing standard 
operating procedure (SOP) has identified this requirement; however, the HRA for this job did not 
identify the requirement to install a safety net. Participants in the HRA process included 
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appropriate subject matter experts including the area safety officer and experienced operating 
personnel. Prior to this event, experienced plant personnel and safety officers walked by and did 
not raise any concerns regarding failure to follow the plant SOP. The job owner was 
inexperienced in this role, but adequately trained. The root cause appears to be a lack of effective 
leadership by the area safety officer and experienced plant personnel. 
Schedule management for roaster shutdowns is not effective. The October 2009 
shutdown duration was two days longer than plan because of several deficiencies in project 
execution. The estimated lost production opportunity has an estimated value of $400,000. The 
shutdown did not have a strong daily focus on working to the defined schedule. It is essential that 
the shutdown manager set the tone to ensure all job owners are aware of this responsibility. This 
did not occur because of inexperience and lack of necessary training. 
The October 2010 shutdown duration was five days longer than plan due to time required 
to complete necessary work in the roaster Venturi tower. Certainly, the condition of this vessel 
was poorer than expected and it was necessary to increase scope of work. The job owner 
managed the scope change well. He identified the potential problem to senior management who 
approved the increase in scope of work. Management then assigned additional people to manage 
this job to minimize schedule impact. However, process equipment condition does not fully 
explain the cause of the five-day extension. 
The Venturi repair job started poorly. Detailed plans identified the need to install non-
standard scaffolding due to the geometry of this vessel and specific job requirements. This 
information was contained in the job specific work package issued to the job owner and to the 
contractor. In spite of this information, the contractor, with acceptance of the job owner, chose to 
install standard scaffolding. Once installed, the contractors found that standard scaffolding was 
not satisfactory, and it was necessary to take this down and replace it according to the original 
plan. Additionally, the contractor brought in a crane with a boom of insufficient length at the start 
of the shutdown, and needed to replace it with a suitable crane. The job owner did not discuss 
crane details with the contractor prior to the shutdown based on an understanding that the 
contractor was well familiar with the worksite. These two deficiencies resulted in putting the 
project two days behind schedule at the start of the schedule. The lost opportunity due to 
extending the roaster shutdown in 2010 was $1,000,000 of which $400,000 can be attributed to 
shutdown management deficiencies. These deficiencies were a result of an inexperienced job 
owner not understanding the work plan and failing to ensure that the contractors performed the 
job according to plan. 
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Cost management for roaster shutdowns is not effective. Many of the tools are in place 
including: a daily recorded count of contractor workers on-site, the requirement for contractors to 
submit labour tracking sheets on a daily basis to Teck, job owner approval of tracking sheets, and 
a cost centre for collecting and compiling all information. The cost centre provides daily 
summaries to the shutdown job owners and the shutdown project manager. Smelter shutdown 
experience highlights the potential strength of this system. During the course of the smelter 
shutdown, job owners review all information and provide daily updates on cost to date and final 
estimated cost for each project. The shutdown project manager compiles all project cost 
information and reviews overall trends and projections. On conclusion of the 2010 smelter 
shutdown, the project manager identified total shutdown cost within $200,000 of the final cost of 
$37.3 million and he was fully aware of all areas of potential exposure. 
At the roasters, the 2010 Venturi tower repair extended well beyond the original planned 
schedule. Plant management assigned additional resources to manage this job to minimize the 
schedule impact; however, neither the job owner nor the shutdown project manager identified the 
cost overrun for this job. The original budget for Venturi repairs plus hot precipitator was 
$1,350,000. Pre-shutdown, the finance group defined separate budget codes for the two jobs, but 
the job owner did not ensure proper separation of costs. Based on records maintained by the cost 
centre, a cost increase of $292,000 for these two jobs was booked at the end of 2010. Subsequent 
to this, in March 2011, the shutdown project manager identified an additional cost increase of 
$314,000 for these two jobs. Personnel involved attributed this problem to late submission of 
tracking sheets by the contractor. Neither the job owner, nor the shutdown project manager had 
performed any cross checking of daily worker count against tracking sheets. While certainly the 
largest discrepancy, other projects also demonstrated similar lack of job cost management. The 
root cause of this problem is lack of cost management by shutdown management team. The 
shutdown management team has not received necessary training in cost management. 
The roaster shutdown team does not have an effective means for learning from its 
experience. Occasionally individual roaster job owners will complete a post mortem of their 
specific jobs; however, this is rare. The roaster shutdown manager leads a high-level shutdown 
post mortem meeting with shutdown job owners and support staff. He then prepares a post 
mortem document based on their input. This post mortem is very superficial and does not identify 
root cause of identified items, nor identify any responsibilities for follow up.  
When major problems occur in a shutdown such as the poor safety results for the 2009 
shutdown, the roaster operating manager will initiate separate actions to prevent reoccurrence. To 
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determine how to improve safety performance, he met with the projects manager to determine 
necessary changes to the roaster shutdown process. This resulted in revising the shutdown 
organizational structure to create specific accountability for job owners to manage contractor 
work practices to the pre-defined safe work plans. This change contributed to the improved safety 
results achieved in 2010; however, the roaster shutdown team continues to have difficulty 
managing shutdowns to defined expectations. This problem is a result of an inexperienced team 
that does not have the necessary skills and training. 
2.4.2 Roaster Front-End Engineering and Planning Capacity 
Roaster front-end engineering and planning activities for major shutdowns do not deliver 
value for Trail Operations. Furthermore, the plant has difficulty in managing process equipment 
condition. The front-end engineers complete their activities in a hasty manner, resulting in late 
material deliveries and additional costs for specialized transportation arrangements. This section 
highlights several examples demonstrating a lack of effective front-end engineering and planning 
capacity at the roasters. This is due to a lack of technical depth in the business area and the lack 
of an effective process to build depth. The roaster organization is highly dependent on one 
experienced engineer who regularly assists with plant emergencies and problems in other 
departments.  
Effective shutdown scope identification starts with a strong understanding of condition of 
plant process equipment. Equipment monitoring on an ongoing basis ensures a clear 
understanding of current equipment condition, and helps to develop an understanding of the link 
between process operating parameters and equipment condition. This focused approach ensures 
reliable operation of process equipment during the operating campaign, as well as a clear 
understanding of required inspection and repair activities for future shutdowns. The current 
structure for the front-end engineers does not promote a focused approach to front end 
engineering. 
Unexpected equipment failures demonstrate deficiency in understanding process 
equipment condition. In November 2006, one of the cooling towers in the gas cleaning circuit had 
an unexpected packing collapse. To minimize the production interruption and manage within the 
available budget, a temporary $450,000 short-term repair was completed. The short-term fix has 
failed in 2009 and a $2,000,000 repair is required to ensure satisfactory operation for the long 
term. The unexpected failure was due to a lack of focus on equipment condition. 
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Deterioration of the Venturi towers was first identified in 2008 when process solution 
began to leak from the towers creating gassy conditions in the plant due fuming of sulphur 
dioxide from this process solution. Routine equipment inspections may have identified this 
problem earlier; however, a focused approach to managing process equipment condition could 
have prevented this problem.  
The root cause of the Venturi tower leaks was failure of the silica brick lining in this 
vessel due to fluoride attack. Fluoride concentration in the circulating solution increased because 
of the need to treat a recycle material elevated in fluorine. Some time earlier, the plant eliminated 
routine chemical analysis of the circulating solution as a cost saving measure. When it was 
necessary to begin processing the recycle material there was inadequate consideration of potential 
impacts on process equipment. Once this situation was recognized, one of the plant engineers 
initiated a weekly chemical analysis of this solution for halides at an annual cost of less than 
$2,000. Operating procedures are in place to adjust the bleed stream from this circuit when 
necessary to control fluoride impurity. Total expenditure for repairing the two towers affected is 
in excess of $1,500,000. The root cause of fluoride damage to the towers is a combination of 
ineffective change control protocols and a lack of focus on equipment condition.  
Unfortunately, there is a limited availability of experienced personnel in the business 
area. Many engineers are rotating through the plant to meet training requirements for new 
graduates. As a result, the business area has become highly dependent on the knowledge of one 
experienced engineer and the operating manager who plans to retire soon. This situation exposes 
the business area to increased risk of equipment failures in the future due to lack of experience. 
This situation has come about due to a strong focus on achieving short-term business results and 
an inadequate focus on long-term management team strength for the business area. Change is 
required to ensure effective knowledge transfer to the future leaders and support staff for this 
business unit. 
Front-end engineers develop shutdown scope as part of the budget preparation process. 
Shutdown scope is highly dependent on inspection results of previous shutdowns. During a 
shutdown, plant engineers perform numerous shutdown inspections, and record equipment 
condition in a shutdown photographic library. However, there is no formal analysis or review of 
the importance of this information. Recently one of the engineers began to issue high-level 
inspection reports. This initiative should help in planning future shutdowns, provided this practice 
does not stop. 
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With planning tied to the budget process and corporate endorsement of the budget 
occurring very late in the year, front-end engineers rush project planning, resulting in 
performance gaps. For example in 2008, the plant procured a fibreglass reinforced plastic 
component from a shop in Ontario. Due to late and ineffective communications with the supplier, 
manufacturing of this $30,000 component was late. To meet shutdown timelines, purchasing 
arranged for team drivers to truck this component across Canada at an additional cost of $8,000. 
This component arrived one day late because of road restrictions and so installation did not occur. 
Alternate field repairs were completed and this component remains in storage. This problem is a 
result of high dependence of the business area on a few individuals and lack of effective 
coordination with the purchasing group. 
This mode of rushed planning has become normal practice. In 2010, Trail Operations had 
a site-wide project to implement changes to reduce the risk of environmental spills to the river. 
This project required replacement of several oil coolers to mainline equipment at the roasters. 
This work could only be completed during shutdowns, and thus more than one order of coolers 
was brought in on a rush basis at an estimated cost of $20,000. This problem identifies a lack of 
effective coordination with the purchasing group. 
Scope documents are often lacking in required detail for effective job planning. This is 
especially the case for the experienced engineer who completes front-end engineering for many 
of the more specialized projects and thus does not take the time to include the necessary level of 
detail in these documents. This requires the job owners to return to the experienced engineer for 
further definition of these details. Job owners also typically involve this engineer in the 
preparation of safe work plans due. The roaster organization lacks sufficient technical depth to 
perform effective front-end engineering and planning activities. 
2.4.3 Safety and Health Management 
Trail Operations does not have the capacity to support health and safety management of 
major shutdowns to expected standards. Previous sections have identified problems in completing 
work safely due to inadequacies in shutdown management. This section identifies difficulties in 
developing safe work plans in a timely manner because of a lack of available personnel with 
strong environmental, health and safety (EH&S) skills for shutdown management. Additionally 
there is a need to develop effective protocols for employees working with mercury-contaminated 
equipment.  
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Shutdown projects require contractors to prepare safe work plans before beginning work. 
This is not only good practice, but is a mandatory WorkSafeBC requirement. Development of 
safe work plans for shutdowns at Trail Operations requires the combined input of several subject 
matter experts including plant representatives to define specific scope of work and known 
hazards, contractors who provide specific trades knowledge, and EH&S experts familiar with 
regulatory requirements. The EH&S department was not able to provide timely assistance for the 
2010 smelter shutdown. Due to lack of available expert resources, the smelter shutdown manager 
assisted the job owners whenever possible. 
When it became evident that the EH&S organization could not provide the necessary 
support for the smelter shutdown, Ed Kniel, a former Trail employee was seconded from Teck‟s 
CESL group in Vancouver in June 2010 to provide the necessary assistance and leadership. 
Again, due to lack of available resources, the opportunity to develop a potential successor for this 
position was lost. The root cause was a failure to recognize the nature and importance of this role 
at Trail Operations. 
With Ed Kniel on site, critical EH&S issues were addressed allowing safe work plans to 
progress; however, hygiene reviews became the next bottleneck. The requirement for hygiene 
permits is a recent development, and communication to the shutdown management team was 
ineffective. This review requires hygiene technicians to assess recommended personal protective 
equipment (PPE) for specific tasks against personal hygiene sampling data. A shortage of hygiene 
resources delayed these reviews, with the last one completed in September 2010 (Marsh, 2011: 
13) one month before the shutdown. Contractors rely on a fully completed HRA to prepare the 
safe work plan for their workers. Many contractors wait until they received verification that they 
have a fully complete HRA before starting to prepare their safe work plans. As a result, many 
contractor safe work plans were prepared in a hasty manner. For example, WKM their safe work 
plan a few days before the smelter feed off. The root cause of the delay in completing hygiene 
reviews for shutdown HRAs is ineffective communication between the EH&S group and the 
shutdown management teams.  
In March 2011, the roaster shutdown team has experienced similar delays in preparing for 
the April 2011 major shutdown of #10 Roaster. Four weeks before the shutdown, all aspects of 
the HRAs are complete, except for the hygiene reviews. This is the first time that hygiene permits 
have been required for roaster shutdown work. The hygiene department informed the job owners 
for the roaster shutdown of the requirement for hygiene permits less than two months before the 
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start of this shutdown. This experience reinforces the need for better EH&S communication with 
the shutdown management teams. 
Mercury handling concerns have recently become a high focus concern item. Because of 
this concern, a group began to develop protocols for handling mercury at Trail in a satisfactory 
manner to protect workers. Unfortunately, the group issued this document on September 27, 2010 
a few days before the start of the smelter shutdown, and much too late to be included in the 
control plans for smelter activities. From a shutdown management perspective, the root cause of 
this problem is a lack of understanding by EH&S personnel of the impact of changes in safe work 
protocols to shutdown planning activities.  
The roaster organization had a similar experience in 2008 with a very late change in 
safety standards for isolating confined spaces. The lockout team for the roaster shutdown decided 
to revise all applicable procedures in the weeks prior to start of the shutdown. This resulted in 
significant confusion to the shutdown management team. In many cases, job owners were not 
aware of the full extent of revisions made creating delays to the start of several jobs. It is critical 
that the issuance of revised safety and health protocols recognize potential impact on shutdowns. 
Failure to follow the new protocols can create political difficulties, while following them without 
adequate time to prepare creates worksite confusion. 
The plants have recently experience a significant increase in the number of jobs requiring 
procedures to protect workers from the risk of mercury exposure. Early in the 2010 smelter 
shutdown, a discrepancy in the method used by the hygiene department to test for elemental 
mercury vapour was discovered. The extent to which this problem has affected previous mercury 
vapour measurements in roaster shutdown and routine maintenance activities is not known. This 
problem identifies a lack of technical depth within the EH&S group. 
The 2010 roaster shutdown included repairs to the mercury removal tower. Routine blood 
sampling of workers during the course of the work identified a concern with some results 
exceeding 15 µg/L. When this problem arose, Teck stopped this job for 81 hours to perform a 
detailed review of all procedures associated with this job. The review identified a potential 
exposure to workers while removing contaminated gloves. The safe work procedures were 
changed, communicated to all workers, and then work restarted. The roaster organization 
managed this difficult situation very well. This experience highlights the importance of walking 
through safe work plans before beginning work to ensure control measures are effective.  
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Overall, there is poor level of understanding amoungst much of the workforce regarding 
the various chemical forms of mercury and the relative hazard of each. (Kniel, 2010: 36) Events 
such as the mercury tower experience create significant concern in the workplace. A portable 
Jerome meter is now readily available to measure atmospheric mercury vapour. Personnel with an 
inadequate understanding of the limitations of this instrument, and how to interpret results have 
used it in the workplace. Poor quality information developed in this manner has created a high 
degree of anxiety within the workforce. The root cause is a lack of controls or protocols for 
introducing new safety equipment within the workplace.  
Another challenge related to mercury management is the cleaning of the powered air 
purifying respirators (PAPRs). Due lack of a demonstrated cost effective cleaning method 500 
units used in mercury atmospheres have been bagged and placed in storage bins (Marsh, 2011). 
With a cost of $600 per unit, a cost effective means of cleaning will realize a saving of $300,000 
by avoiding the need to replace these units. Existing staff require the assistance of expert 
technical help to overcome this problem. 
2.4.4 Shutdown Waste Management 
Trail Operations has designed its process operations to avoid producing process wastes 
and is currently working to treat accumulated process materials. Similarly, Trail Operations now 
has a project team working on water management to determine options for future operation with 
minimum or zero discharge of water effluent to the Columbia River. Waste material management 
has not received the same high focus at Trail Operations and this is resulting in stocking of 
shutdown waste materials that are not easily disposed of. This section describes various problems 
in managing shutdown wastes because defined responsibility for this issue is lacking. 
Until recently, the scope of front-end engineering activity was limited to developing 
plans and cost estimates for developing solutions to specific problems. Waste disposal issues 
were not included in the scope of many projects. A common understanding was that waste 
materials could be set aside and eventually treated by the plants. Clear responsibility for 
managing the more troublesome waste materials is not evident. Where options exist, standards for 
delivery of waste are not clearly defined, or adhered to. Teck has individuals responsible for 
specific aspects of material waste management, but there is not a coherent process in place. The 
root cause is a lack of clear responsibility for this problem. 
Currently waste materials disposal options include treatment in existing process plants, 
surplus sales, on-site landfill for clean wastes, and off-site landfill for contaminated materials. 
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Cleanliness standards for surplus sales and on-site landfill are well established and adhered to. 
This demonstrates that Trail Operations can effectively manage waste materials provided that 
clear definition of requirements and management responsibilities are in place and are well 
communicated. 
The #2 slag-fuming furnace is a common destination for light burnable materials such as 
bag house bags, and waste one tonne bulk bags. This method of treating these waste materials 
results in an annual cost savings in excess of $200,000. The plant has defined acceptable 
standards for acceptable waste materials working with the environment group. Standards ensure 
the safety of furnace workers, prevent environmental harm, and prevent process problems such as 
furnace jacket failures or explosions. Past difficulties include an event in which the furnace 
discharged a large cloud of smoke. This event was clearly visible in downtown Trail and 
appeared on the front page of the Trail Times the next day. Consistent adherence to standards is 
essential to ensure that Trail Operations does not lose its social licence to treat these waste 
materials in a cost effective and socially responsible manner. 
The smelter organization has defined very clear standards and approval procedures for 
treating waste materials in the #2 furnace. Waste materials must be dry and free of mercury or 
substances that may produce dioxins on combustion. The waste generator must fully fill and stuff 
waste materials into an appropriate bag. The process engineer for this area reviews all waste 
material treatment requests. During the 2010 smelter shutdown, routine audits identified 
inappropriate materials contained in bags directed for treatment in this furnace. This problem was 
caused by a lack of effective controls with unattended bags left open during stuffing. Workers 
walking by simply dropped unauthorized materials in these bags. Changes are required to ensure 
that this option for waste treatment remains a viable option for Trail Operations. The root cause is 
a lack of focus on adhering to defined waste disposal standards. 
Mercury contaminated waste materials are a particularly challenging concern. Currently 
Trail Operations has two processing options. Lightweight materials such as plastic tower packing 
material can be disposed of in one of the zinc roasters. The generator of the waste must bag this 
material. The roasters are now processing a significant backlog of this material. In 2010, the 
smelter defined a method for processing lead metal contaminated by mercury. There is significant 
backlog of this material this material and treatment is very slow. In all cases, treatment requires 
plant operators to manually handle packaged waste materials and feed them into the roaster or 
furnace. Management focus is required to ensure regular processing of these materials. 
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Until recently, the next option for disposal of mercury-contaminated wastes from Trail 
Operations was to ship this material to the Clean Harbours landfill facility near Sarnia Ontario. 
Following completion of the 2010 roaster and smelter shutdowns, the shutdown managers were 
informed that Clean Harbours has a maximum mercury specification 500 ppm for incoming 
materials. As a result, the smelter and the roaster teams inventoried their waste materials post-
shutdown. The smelter was fortunate in that shutdown wastes contained acceptable levels of 
contamination. The roasters were not as fortunate and will need to repackage materials from bulk 
storage containers. Plant engineers estimate that repackaging will cost in the order of $300,000. 
More significantly, there is not a defined destination for heavier mercury contaminated materials 
such as tower packing support beams and grating. The root cause of this problem is a lack of clear 
site responsibility for this problem. Because of this situation, front-end engineer and job owners 
develop disposal plans in isolation, and on a best efforts basis.  
Previous KIVCET shutdowns have resulted in producing thallium contaminated waste 
materials such as scaffolding. The disposal route for this material was treatment in #2 slag fuming 
furnace. This disposal option disappeared when it was linked to premature failure of furnace sole 
jackets. Changed methods for cleaning the KIVCET boiler has eliminated the problem of thallium 
contaminated scaffolding; however, the smelter replaced a KIVCET boiler tube bundle in 2005. 
Without an identified destination for the old tube bundle, it was placed at a location formerly used 
as a temporary storage location for zinc concentrates. This has slightly reduced flexibility in zinc 
concentrate handling at Trail. More importantly, there is not a permanent destination for thallium-
contaminated materials such as the boiler tube bundle. The root cause is a lack of defined 
responsibility for managing waste materials. 
In the sulphuric acid plants service crew personnel clean the bottom of gas-gas heat 
exchangers and “knock out” vessels by shovelling the iron sulphate sludge into barrels. This 
material contains both mercury and nitrous oxide impurities. In this case, the nitrous oxide 
impurity is the major concern, as contact with waster will release a brown cloud of nitrous oxide 
gas from the sludge. In 1998, the plant installed a primitive means of processing this material in a 
ventilated tent. This treatment method stopped about five years ago because of worker safety 
concerns. Well over one hundred sealed barrels of this material is stored outside of the acid 
plants, and production of this contaminated iron sulphate sludge continues. A satisfactory method 
of processing this material is clearly required. The root cause of this problem is a lack of defined 
responsibility. 
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2.4.5 Additional Issues 
Shutdown personnel have identified several additional challenges. Most important of 
these is the inadequacy of existing infrastructure. A review of the cost overrun for the Venturi 
repair job identified an unexpected cost of $120,000 in labour and overhead costs for transporting 
workers between the Warfield change rooms and the worksite at the roasters because of a 
shortage of nearby change room facilities. Similarly, deficiencies in the contractor lunchroom at 
the smelter required contractors to remove coveralls in a separate area before walking to the 
lunchroom. With two scheduled breaks every day, this easily added 30 minutes of non-productive 
time each day for all contract workers. Total cost for this one deficiency is $1.4 million. This 
issue has not received adequate attention due to lack of a focused resource to develop a solution. 
Plans are in progress to begin installing a new furnace in the smelter area. Now may well be the 
right time to invest in additional infrastructure. 
Previous post mortems have identified the need to develop succession plans for the 
smelter shutdown manager. The 2010 smelter shutdown was an ideal opportunity to provide 
exposure and training to potential candidates. Trail Operations did not achieve any progress 
towards this objective in 2010 and there is currently no succession plan for this important role. 
The root cause of this problem is a lack of identified responsibility for filling this position. 
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3: Recommendations 
This chapter presents recommendations to address the issues identified in shutdown 
execution and management. These recommendations build on identified gaps in shutdown 
management and demonstrated success in improving shutdown performance at the smelter. I 
recommend that fulltime shutdown project manager and shutdown EH&S manager positions be 
established for Trail Operations to achieve best practice in the management of major shutdowns. 
In addition, I recommend that the roaster business area establish process equipment integrity 
teams to increase its focus on process equipment condition and to effectively transfer technical 
knowledge to the next generation of engineers. A shutdown management steering committee is 
required to oversee the shutdown management process and to implement necessary change 
initiatives to deliver the required improvement in shutdown management performance. 
3.1 Full Time Shutdown Manager 
Specialized project management skills are required to achieve effective shutdown 
management for the major shutdowns. A shutdown manager must have effective planning skills, 
strong communication skills, attention to detail in a very dynamic environment, and the ability to 
hold the shutdown management team accountable for its performance. Discussions with smelter 
personnel at five other smelters including Canadian, American, and Australian operations indicate 
that the Trail lead smelter exhibits an uncommon best practice, or near best practice, on all critical 
areas of shutdown management. A very common understanding of shutdown management is that 
shutdown scope is loosely defined and many changes occur as inspections are made (InterPlan, 
2005). The smelter shutdown team has demonstrated that this need not be the reality of shutdown 
management at Trail and the smelter shutdown manager has had an important leadership role in 
changing this reality. I recommend that the incumbent smelter shutdown manager be recognized 
and assigned to a fulltime role of shutdown manager. This change will enable other business areas 
at Trail to benefit from his shutdown management skills and knowledge. 
The smelter team has demonstrated the ability to manage shutdowns as projects with the 
added challenges of protecting workers from significant process material and physical hazards, 
extensive permitting requirements, compressed timelines, and the ability to effective work with 
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the results of equipment inspections. This team has effectively integrated many of the Trail 
support functions into the shutdown process. It has carefully managed scope, completed 
shutdowns on schedule, and managed costs to budget. The team has established effective quality 
management, developed personnel for shutdown roles in a timely manner, and established 
effective communication protocols. It has effectively managed project risks, and has achieved 
significant improvement in procurement activities. This team manages all of the eleven generally 
accepted project knowledge areas (Project Management Institute, 1996) to a high standard. 
Comprehensive job specific and shutdown organization post mortems are now completed, and 
follow up plans are developed. Many of the deficiencies identified in 2005 have been resolved. 
The 2010 shutdown post mortem has identified additional deficiencies to resolve and the core 
smelter-shutdown management team is working on a path of continuous improvement to achieve 
best shutdown management practice. 
Recognizing that the smelter shutdown management-team has evolved and has developed 
essential and unique skills to ensure effective management of shutdowns it is clear that other 
business areas at Trail are likely to benefit. The roaster business area has a strong need to improve 
its management of major shutdowns. From 2009 to 2010, the roasters experienced an 
improvement in safety performance by changing the shutdown organizational structure to align 
with the structure used to manage major shutdowns at the smelter. The 2010 experience 
demonstrates the need for a significant improvement from this result. This is most easily achieved 
by working with well qualified on-site experts in shutdown management. 
The smelter business area has identified an opportunity to improve shutdown 
management effectiveness of their minor and opportunity shutdowns by applying common 
practices used to manage major smelter shutdowns such as scheduling and completing post 
mortems. Similarly, the zinc-leaching business area has identified the need to improve several 
aspects of shutdown management. Plant personnel have identified the need for improved 
interplant communication and scheduling. Implementation of post mortems with identified root 
causes of problems will ensure additional benefits.  
Furthermore, the existing smelter-shutdown management team is not fully occupied in 
planning and managing shutdowns. Currently the smelter shutdown manager only works in this 
capacity when required to plan and execute major smelter shutdowns. Outside of these times, he 
oversees implementation of the portfolio of minor and major projects in the lead smelter and 
refineries. I recommend that the smelter shutdown manager will deliver greater value to Trail 
Operations by assisting other business area to in establishing improved shutdown practices. To 
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make this happen would require hiring an additional project group superintendent. The annual 
cost for this position is less than $200,000 per year. The following sections describe the 
recommended responsibilities for the full time shutdown manager. The first three sections address 
specific problems identified earlier, and the next two identify additional opportunities to deliver 
value for Trail Operations. 
3.1.1 Lead Smelter Shutdown Manager 
This responsibility includes all activities required to effectively prepare for and lead the 
execution and coordination of smelter shutdowns. This includes ensuring all projects have a 
defined written scope, and are executed to meet the safety, environmental, cost and schedule 
objectives set by Teck management. The KIVCET 2010 Shutdown Roles and Responsibility 
document effectively describes the specific responsibilities of this position. 
To ensure smelter shutdowns continue to meet expected performance levels requires full 
time commitment by the smelter shutdown manager to this role for six to seven months for every 
major shutdown. This includes four months of detailed planning prior to the shutdown, one month 
to manage the shutdown and a minimum of one month for follow up. The incumbent shutdown 
manager will continue to lead in this position until he has developed a successor. 
In addition to this full time commitment, the shutdown manager requires 10-20% of his 
time to prepare for the next smelter shutdown. Activities include familiarization with specific 
shutdown projects, ensuring front-end engineering activities stay on schedule, and initiating 
coordinating activities with other groups. This is an ongoing responsibility for the incumbent 
based on the effectiveness of past practice. 
3.1.2 Management of Major Roaster Shutdowns 
The shutdown manager has two options for managing major roaster shutdowns. One is to 
take on this responsibility and the second is provide oversight, guidance and mentoring to the 
senior shutdown coordinator for the roasters. The first option is a suitable option for the short 
term; however, if the shutdown manager begins with this approach he must evolve his role to the 
second approach to meet the long-term needs for shutdown management at Trail Operations. 
Taking on the role of roaster shutdown manger will ensure a rapid improvement in 
roaster shutdown performance. Job owners will fully become aware of their responsibilities and 
learn the necessary skills to safety manage projects, without environmental harm, on time and on 
budget by ensuring contractors work to predefined plans. Job owners will communicate problems 
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in a timely manner during the course of the shutdown. The shutdown manager will become 
familiar with the unique aspects of roaster operation such as the need to complete work while 
parallel process is in operation. Unfortunately, this approach will result in the incumbent smelter 
shutdown manager becoming invaluable for another critical position at Trail Operations. A 
second equally important problem is the occasional requirement for overlapping roaster and 
smelter shutdowns. 
I recommend that the position of roaster shutdown manager become an opportunity to 
train the successor for the current smelter shutdown manager. The roaster business area regularly 
experiences the second largest shutdown event at Trail. These shutdowns are significant in capital 
expenditure, and have similar process, safety and environmental challenges as experienced at the 
smelter. The roasters have one major shutdown every year, and thus there are many more 
opportunities to become a proficient shutdown manager at the roasters than is possible at the 
smelter.  
The major shutdown manager should provide technical oversight of the roaster shutdown 
manager. The major shutdown manager will need to frame recommended responsibilities and 
timelines for roaster shutdowns that will require the endorsement of the roaster operating 
manager. On his endorsement, the major shutdown manager can provide necessary technical 
leadership and guidance to ensure that the roaster shutdown manager performs her/his 
responsibilities in a timely and effective manner. When the roaster shutdown manager faces 
obstacles that the operating manger cannot address, the major shutdown manager will be able to 
provide additional support and options for consideration. 
The major shutdown manager will have full technical responsibilities for the roaster 
shutdown manager including recommendation of essential training. The major shutdown manager 
will evaluate the roaster shutdown manager to determine suitability for the role of smelter 
shutdown manager. Recognizing that the incumbent smelter shutdown manger will likely retire 
after two more smelter shutdowns, development of the roaster shutdown manager is time critical 
if this position is to be used to develop the successor for the smelter shutdown manager. It may be 
necessary to put other individuals in the role of roaster shutdown manger if the incumbent does 
not develop as quickly as necessary. 
The shutdown manager will add technical depth to the existing shutdown management 
team by ensuring all essential planning and team training occurs. He will define shutdown team 
roles and responsibilities with input from the roaster operating manger. He will guide the roaster 
shutdown manger to ensure all individuals understand their roles and are trained to effectively 
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perform their duties, and are accountable for performing to the defined expectations. He will also 
have the opportunity to identify critical gaps in real time and develop plants to address them. This 
change will build capacity of the roaster shutdown team to manage shutdowns to the expected 
standards for Trail Operations.  
3.1.3 Improve Shutdown Performance at Trail 
An important role for the shutdown manager is to improve shutdown performance at 
Trail. Currently smelter shutdowns suffer from deficiencies in a number of areas such as 
contractor capacity to develop safe and efficient work plans, and due to low worker productivity 
resulting from deficiencies in the Trail infrastructure. The incumbent is well familiar with the 
specific details of these issues and I recommend that he identify options for addressing these 
issues. 
In the areas of contractor capacity, it may require working with existing contractors to 
increase their capacity, and/or to consider evaluating other contractors for performing these jobs. 
Similarly, an engineering company would likely develop the specific plans for improving site 
infrastructure, but the shutdown manager would be able to define specific requirements to the 
engineer and identify specific benefits to the senior management group that must approve these 
expenditures. This responsibility ensures continuous improvement of smelter shutdowns, and 
provides opportunities to achieve gains for other business areas. 
3.1.4 Minor and Opportunity Shutdowns 
Several business areas at Trail Operations have identified opportunities to improve 
shutdown management. Many of the specific issues are similar to those experienced in managing 
major shutdowns. I believe this is an opportunity for the incumbent to leverage his knowledge of 
existing skills and systems to assist with these issues. This section reviews specific opportunities 
for to improve performance of smelter minor shutdowns and zinc leaching plant opportunity 
shutdowns. 
The lead smelter has identified an opportunity improve management of minor and 
opportunity shutdowns. Minor shutdowns have many of the same challenges as the major 
shutdowns including EH&S management, scheduling, cost management, and communications. 
Quality post mortems and follow up are essential to achieving performance improvement. The 
smelter shutdown manager is well familiar with the smelter site. Discussions between the 
shutdown manager and the operating manager will define the required skill development for the 
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smelter senior shutdown coordinator. Capturing small gains by reducing the length of smelter 
shutdowns will achieve significant production benefits through the year with eight opportunity 
shutdowns and one minor shutdown in the smelter every year. The operating manager has 
identified the need for post mortems for these shutdowns. Guidance and training by the major 
shutdown manager will ensure useful post mortems are prepared. The major shutdown manager 
will also be a useful mentor in developing follow up strategies. This role will also expose the 
shutdown manager to other potential candidates for succession planning purposes. 
The zinc leaching plant has identified the need to improve shutdown performance. 
Critical aspects are effective coordination with the cell cleaning activities in the electrolytic plant, 
and improving plant start up protocols. The major shutdown manager could provide technical 
assistance to the plant by reviewing scheduling practices and communication strategies; however, 
more importantly is to establish the process of continuous improvement by routinely completing a 
post mortem following each shutdown and then establishing follow up strategies. The practice of 
post mortems is not common in the leaching business area. The major shutdown project manager 
will need to develop a strategy to provide needed training and mentoring. 
3.1.5 Mentoring Plant Shutdown Coordinators 
The shutdown manager will establish a working team of plant shutdown coordinators to 
review plant post mortem suggestions and develop common approaches to solving problems. He 
will identify common difficulties and prepare training and other strategies to overcome these 
difficulties. The manager will be available as an expert resource to provide guidance for the plant 
coordinators. The shutdown manager will be able to leverage on established shutdown procedures 
and training to achieve benefits for other business areas. 
3.2 Shutdown Environment, Health and Safety Management 
The 2010 smelter shutdown experience demonstrated the need for a smelter shutdown 
EH&S manager. I recommend that Trail Operation hire a well-qualified individual for in the 
fulltime position of shutdown EH&S manager. He/she will provide specific expertise to ensure 
Trail‟s environmental, health and safety systems fully support shutdown requirements. The 
annual salary cost for this position will be less than $200,000.  
The shutdown EH&S manager will report to the Trail Manager, EH&S but routinely 
work with the shutdown project manager. During shutdowns, she/he will functionally report to 
the shutdown project manager and will oversee site safety coordinators, environmental engineers, 
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and technicians. This individual must be capable of working in a very dynamic and changing 
environment to meet shutdown needs. This individual must also be effective between shutdowns 
while working in an EH&S support role.  
This individual will be responsible to manage EH&S shutdown planning activities, 
manage the shutdown EH&S function, improve the EH&S process for shutdowns, and establish 
site protocols for shutdown waste management. The person selected must be well experienced in 
managing environmental and safety responsibilities within an industrial metallurgical complex. 
The following sections describe the recommend responsibilities for the shutdown EH&S 
manager. 
3.2.1 EH&S Shutdown Preparation 
The shutdown EH&S manager is responsible to ensure effective input to the shutdown 
planning process to ensure that work can be completed without harm to workers or the 
environment. He/she will become familiar with all planned jobs and consider both job specific 
and macro jobsite issues. The incumbent will also define EH&S support requirements for the 
shutdown. 
The incumbent will become familiar with specific shutdown projects in the year leading 
up to the shutdown and assist the job owners in developing safe work plans. This individual will 
ensure that these plans not only address the specific environmental, health and safety aspects of 
the specific job, but also recognize the potential for overlapping hazards with other jobs on site. 
This person is responsible to ensure that the project adheres to and effectively implements Trail‟s 
environment, health and safety policies. She/he will identify potential macro issues that could 
affect shutdown execution and will recommend strategies to address these issues. 
The shutdown EH&S manager will ensure the contribution of appropriate subject matter 
experts to assist the job owners in preparing safe work plans. The incumbent identifies 
opportunities to involve additional personnel in a controlled manner for development purposes. 
He/she will ensure that contractors are involved as early as possible in developing shutdown 
plans. Contractors will be encouraged to include their safety representatives into this process to 
ensure a good understanding of the safe work plans, and to understand local contractor capability 
so that there are no surprises during the shutdown. The shutdown EH&S manager assesses 
qualifications of each contractor‟s „qualified person‟ prior to accepting these individuals on site.  
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A key deliverable is to define the EH&S expectations and expectations of all personnel 
working within the shutdown. She/he will recommend specific EH&S organizational roles within 
the overall shutdown management team to achieve expected environment, health and safety 
standards. The incumbent will work with support groups such as the medical, industrial hygiene, 
and analytical services groups to ensure adequate preparation for the demands of the upcoming 
shutdown(s). These responsibilities directly address the EH&S resource deficiencies identified for 
smelter shutdowns and will contribute to improved EH&S safety planning at the roasters.   
3.2.2 EH&S Support for Shutdown Execution 
During plant shutdowns, this individual has overall responsibility for coordinating 
environmental, health and safety activities on site. She/he maintains a visible presence on site and 
performs routine audits to confirm all employees on site work to the safe work plans. The 
shutdown EH&S manager ensures that all EH&S personnel provide effective and timely support 
for shutdown activities. Environmental, health and safety measures are tracked to ensure 
compliance to established measures, and performance to expected corporate and regulatory 
standards. 
The shutdown EH&S manager promptly reports all incidents to the shutdown project 
manager. He/she ensures job owners investigate environmental, health and safety incidents in a 
timely manner with participation of appropriate subject matter experts. This individual is Teck‟s 
primary contact for all EH&S activities during the shutdown. She/he meets with Worksafe BC 
and Ministry of Environment officials when they come on site for any purpose.  
The incumbent maintains a daily log of all EH&S activities, discussions and issues, as 
well as a log of issues for post mortems. Following the shutdown she/he leads a EH&S post 
mortem with input from all EH&S employees and issues it to the shutdown project manager and 
the Trail Manager, EH&S. The EH&S manager contributes to the overall smelter shutdown post 
mortem thereby supporting continuous improvement of EH&S activities. 
This role is an essential role for the major smelter shutdowns as demonstrated in 2010. 
The establishment of fulltime shutdown EH&S manager for Trail ensures the availability of a 
qualified person for smelter shutdowns when needed. Working in this role during roaster 
shutdowns, when possible, will ensure strong EH&S support for the roaster team. This 
responsibility will contribute to improvements in safety performance for future shutdowns.  
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3.2.3 Improve EH&S Process for Shutdowns 
An important task will be to review existing processes used to ensure that they deliver the 
required results in an efficient and timely manner. Current experience suggests that there are 
significant bottlenecks in this process due to resource constraints. The process should be reviewed 
to identify methods overcome these delays. 
The incumbent will liaison with technology experts to find efficient ways for the hygiene 
technicians to work with safety and health data. The privacy act limits the information hygiene 
technicians can provide on individual exposures to specific jobs. A much less tedious process 
would benefit both the technicians and the shutdown job owners.  
Workplace standards and demands change regularly in response to new information. The 
recent identification of potential mercury hazards in many more locations is a current example of 
why it is necessary to address these concerns in a timely and effective way. A shutdown EH&S 
manager can work with appropriate personnel within the EH&S group and the shutdown 
management teams to ensure any changes are rolled out in a way that does not impair shutdown 
efficiency or cause harm to workers or the environment. 
This responsibility ensures that the EH&S function at Trail operates efficiently to meet 
shutdown planning requirements. Working with shutdown teams, the incumbent will be well 
aware of the specific requirements of this group. Similarly, the incumbent will also be aware of 
upcoming regulatory changes and can influence the roll out of changes to ensure effective field 
implementation, 
3.2.4 Shutdown Waste Management 
The shutdown EH&S manager will facilitate the process of improving shutdown waste 
management. The full process of shutdown waste management will be considered including, 
temporary storage, cleaning for final disposal, transportation, longer-term storage if required and 
final disposal. The incumbent ensures that appropriate technical standards, permit requirements, 
and cost information are prepared and are easily accessible by the front-end engineers and 
shutdown management teams to allow these individuals to develop effective plans.  
The incumbent may sponsor, lead or participate in teams to address some of today‟s long-
term waste challenges. Periodic auditing of these waste materials is also required. This 
responsibility ensures a single point responsibility of this problem. The incumbent will need to 
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work with individuals in many departments to develop a comprehensive approach to managing 
this problem. 
3.3 Process Equipment Integrity Teams for Roaster Operations 
I recommend that the roaster business area form three integrity teams: one for the 
roasters, a second for the sulphur gas handling (SGH) plants and a third for the zinc pressure-
leach plant. These teams will ensure effective knowledge transfer thereby increasing the number 
of knowledgeable individuals in the business area, reduce risk of process equipment failures, and 
ensure higher quality and improved timeliness of front-end engineering activities. This 
recommendation serves to build roaster front-end engineering and planning capacity. The next 
four sections describe the composition and various responsibilities of the integrity teams. The 
final section identifies an interim measure to improve front-end engineering for process areas 
without integrity teams.  
3.3.1 Integrity Team Composition and Routine Responsibilities 
An effective process-equipment integrity team requires input from various perspectives. 
Based on smelter experience, an ideal team includes participation from plant maintenance 
engineers, plant process engineers, operating management, area operators, plant technicians and 
available site subject matter experts. The team meets on a regular basis with frequency defined by 
the level of activity required for the process area. For example, the smelter-furnace integrity 
group meets monthly while the smelter-boiler integrity group meets quarterly. Based on this 
experience and current process equipment condition in the roaster business area I suggest that the 
SGH integrity team meet monthly and the other two teams quarterly. Further discussion of 
integrity teams will focus on the SGH team. This should be the first team established because of 
equipment condition and process needs. 
The SGH team will have oversight of the wet electrostatic precipitators, the mercury 
removal plant, the three acid plants, and ammonia scrubbing. Prior to meetings assigned team 
members will compile status and performance of all major process units in these plants. The team 
will discuss this information, add any additional pertinent information, and follow up on 
previously identified action items. Members identify additional action items during the meeting 
and assign specific responsibilities and timelines. The team distributes minutes to all affected 
plant personnel. Feedback provides useful starting points to identify additional concerns, and to 
discuss the function of this team thus building credibility within the workplace. A team 
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environment will foster the transfer of knowledge and skills from a small number of experienced 
personnel to a larger group of technical personnel in the business area as they discuss current 
issues and equipment problems.  
3.3.2 Integrity Team Shutdown Responsibilities 
During a shutdown, individual team members will have responsibility for quality 
assurance as previously defined for smelter shutdowns. This responsibility includes defined 
equipment inspections and inspections of contractor repair work to defined expectations. This 
responsibility will allow the roaster job owners and contractors to have a high focus on 
completing the work to shutdown plans.  
Following the shutdown the team will review all results and recommend a path forward 
for future routine and shutdown repairs of the process units. Once the integrity team has identified 
shutdown scope, they meet with the operating manager to ensure a full understanding of critical 
activities and subsequently a summary document is prepared. Early shutdown scope identification 
directly addresses critical deficiencies in defining shutdown scope and completing front-end 
engineering activities at the roasters. Scope is determined on a common understanding of 
equipment deficiencies. Early scope identification provides the best opportunity to complete 
front-end engineering and planning activities in a timely manner. 
3.3.3 Integrity Team Planning Responsibilities 
The SGH integrity team will assign individual team members specific responsibilities to 
deliver scope definitions, budget estimates and safe work plans for each defined shutdown 
project. The assigned team members will work the site subject matter experts, engineers, job 
owners, and contractors as required to pre-defined deadlines.  
Schedules for completing safe work plans will consider more than minimum deadline 
requirements. Smelter experience demonstrates that teams build credibility by working to more 
aggressive deadlines; ideally, the team should set deadlines by what is practical to achieve 
looking forward, rather than what is necessary to achieve by working backwards from budget and 
shutdown schedule dates. In this way, the team will be ready to provide necessary project 
information when opportunities arise. 
Many of the defined projects are not new to the operation, but rather are modifications of 
shutdown projects completed in prior years and the team will draw on relevant documents from 
previous shutdowns. Over a period of years the integrity team will build a library of model job 
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plans to simplify this process. This approach will directly address deficiencies in shutdown 
planning and also add planning capacity as model jobs are developed. 
3.3.4 Integrity Team Objectives 
The team will require specific equipment objectives to guide this process. Ideally, one 
would receive this information from the operating manger and the team would work to achieve 
these objectives. This did not occur in the smelter, and it is unlikely to occur in the roaster 
business area. The smelter objective for a four-year operating campaign for the KIVCET furnace 
came from one subject matter expert, and the team worked to define changes needed to achieve 
this result.  
Similarly, the SGH team will need to consider potential objectives, and work in tandem 
with the operating manager to establish clear objectives. One advantage for the SGH integrity 
team is that many of the process units are not unique and the team can look to the experience of 
others. For example, Du Pont has several sulphuric acid plants at various locations across the 
United States. Their standard operating campaign between shutdowns is two years unless 
restricted by local state law. Canadian Electrolytic Zinc operates to an eighteen-month operating 
campaign between shutdowns for their roaster and acid plant operations. This and additional 
benchmarking information will guide the team and the operating manger in defining specific 
objectives for the SGH plants at Trail. Clear objectives will ensure a sound and consistent basis 
for defining shutdown scope.  
3.3.5 Interim Recommendation for Improved Front-End Engineering 
I have included this interim recommendation for improved front-end engineering based 
on the recognition that full implementation of integrity teams in the roaster business area will take 
some time to complete. It is important that the plant allot sufficient time to form strong teams 
rather than rapidly forming teams for all areas. Significant support is required to ensure an 
effective start for these teams. This section identifies an interim measure for defining shutdown 
scope as early as possible for process areas without an integrity team.  
I recommend that the business area manager meet with plant maintenance engineers 
following the shutdown, and discuss inspection results and agree to the scope of work for the next 
shutdown. Preliminary schedules for front-end engineering activities can be defined as soon as 
this is completed, enabling a much earlier start to this activity. This approach avoids the need to 
rush through preparation of shutdown work packages. This interim recommendation serves to 
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achieve an immediate improvement in shutdown planning by ensuring an earlier start to front-end 
engineering activities and planning.  
3.4 Shutdown Management Steering Committee 
The preceding recommendations cross business area boundaries at Trail Operations and 
require the support of additional functional groups at Trail. I recommend the formation of a 
steering committee to define a common vision and objectives for shutdown management at Trail 
Operations. This committee will define the overall strategy, and oversee implementation of these 
change initiatives and other projects designed to deliver the desired improvement in shutdown 
performance. This committee will provide the necessary focus on shutdown management and 
ensure assign accountabilities for implementing the necessary changes on a priority basis. The 
following sections describe committee composition and responsibilities. 
3.4.1 Shutdown Management Steering Committee Composition 
This steering committee should include managers of functional groups most affected by 
shutdown management at Trail. As a minimum, this committee should include managers of 
maintenance services, production, EH&S, and Trail projects. Regularly reporting to this 
committee will be the operating managers of affected plants, the major shutdown manager, and 
the shutdown EH&S manager. Others may report to the steering committee from time to time 
based on the status of specific improvement projects. This structure establishes the necessary 
accountability for operating and shutdown managers to deliver the required changes to the 
shutdown management process at Trail. 
3.4.2 Shutdown Management Steering Committee Responsibilities 
The steering committee will define the common vision and direction for shutdown 
management at Trail, recognizing different needs for the various plants at Trail, as well as the 
nature of each specific shutdown. This responsibility will require broad input from the various 
stakeholders affected. The steering committee will assess all proposed projects and implement 
approved projects to achieve improved performance on a priority basis. The committee will 
monitor progress to ensure achievement of identified goals. The committee also exists to remove 
obstacles experienced by those implementing the changes.  
This paper presents more recommendations to improvement shutdown performance at 
Trail than can be achieved by creating two new positions and changing the focus of engineers in 
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the roaster business area. Additional improvements require the steering committee to initiate 
specific projects with individuals working to solve defined problems and obstacles impairing 
shutdown performance. The committee will ensure business-area manager support for these 
projects before investing in the projects. With support of affected managers, the committee will 
provide the necessary resources to complete the necessary change initiatives.  
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4: Implementation 
Achieving best major maintenance shutdown management practices at Trail Operations requires a 
defined implementation plan. Many organizations try to remake themselves, but only few 
succeed. John P. Kotter in his article “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail” 
(Kotter, 2007) identifies a series of steps associated with successful transformation efforts. This 
chapter proposes an implementation plan based on these concepts. 
4.1 A Case for Action 
To make a change, a case for urgency is required. Over 50% of company transformation 
initiatives fail due to a lack of urgency (Kotter, 2007). The case for implementing changes to 
shutdown management at Trail Operations is significant. 
Successful management of major shutdowns at Trail Operations is essential to the success 
of the business. Trail has experienced significant failures including the worker exposure to 
thallium during the 2001 smelter shutdown. This event raised major questions in regards to 
Trail‟s ability to manage worker health, specifically the required shutdown activities in the 
smelter boiler. The work site was shutdown and a significant extension to the shutdown resulted 
while improved methods for worker protection were developed, and reviewed with all 
stakeholders. Because of this incident, Trail Operations has made significant improvements to 
risk management protocols.  
In 2010, a significant challenge arose in regards to effective management of worker 
exposure to mercury. Fortunately, there was early identification of a potential problem, prompt 
action to improve decontamination procedures. Outstanding questions remain unanswered in 
regards to safe work procedures for working in mercury-contaminated environments. In 2013, the 
lead smelter is planning to perform major repairs to a vessel contaminated with mercury. Will 
there be sufficient focus on mercury management? Will the right information for working with 
mercury-contaminated materials be available, including procedures for dealing with waste 
materials? 
Existing shutdown management practices lead to a lack of focus on building an 
infrastructure to maximize worker productivity during the shutdown. A full time focus on 
  42 
shutdown best practice will ensure shutdown infrastructure improvements are well defined. These 
improvements will achieve significant cost savings, and have the potential to reduce the duration 
of smelter shutdowns. The site facilities to clean powered air purifying respirators (PAPRs) 
demonstrate what Trail can do. A management person recognized the significant cost of replacing 
units that had not been properly stored between shutdowns. Hundred of PAPRs with a cost of 
$600 per unit were disposed as result of this problem. Trail has built a facility to clean and 
properly store these units. The supplier of these units considers this facility to be the world best 
practice. Significant cost savings are achieved every shutdown because of this facility. Many 
other opportunities are readily apparent, but require focus to deliver the benefits. 
The roaster business area has experienced significant difficulties in shutdown 
management due to a lack of experience. This has resulted in poor safety performance, as well as 
difficulty managing shutdown work to budget cost and schedule. Changes are required at the 
roasters to ensure effective shutdown management. 
The smelter shutdown manager has developed a high level of skill and knowledge in 
managing major shutdowns. The roaster business area would benefit from applying his talents to 
the major shutdowns at the roasters, and the lead smelter would benefit by learning from roaster 
shutdown experience. More importantly, Trail Operations needs to develop a successor for the 
smelter shutdown manager. Failure to do so will result in a significant loss of skills for Trail 
Operations and the lead-smelter business area when the incumbent retires. The incumbent has 
made a significant contribution to improving smelter shutdown performance. This individual has 
worked collaboratively with others to develop improved systems. Systems are slowly transferring 
into the roaster business area; however, his skills and knowledge have not been widely taught to 
others. Failure to transfer these skills to other business areas represents a significant lost 
opportunity. 
4.2 Building a Coalition 
“Major renewal programs often start with just one of two people. In cases of successful 
transformation efforts, the leadership coalition grows and grows over time. But whenever some 
minimum mass is not achieved early  … not much happens” (Kotter, 2007: 98).  
The present investigation into shutdown management practices and experience at Trail 
has included interviews and discussion with Manager, Maintenance Services; Projects Manager; 
Operating Manager, Roasting & Sulphur Products; Sr. Shutdown Coordinator, Roasting & 
Sulphur Products; Operating Manager, Lead Smelter Operations; Lead Smelter Shutdown Project 
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Manager. All of these individuals have identified the need to improve in our ability to manage 
shutdowns, and have significant interest in achieving improved results. The need for greater focus 
to achieve this improvement is recognized, and several individuals spoke to the need for a 
permanent team for shutdown management and for mentoring plant personnel managing smaller 
shutdowns.  
The managers in this group are ideal candidates to build support for a defined approach to 
improve shutdown management at Trail. A common understanding of goals and a general path 
forward is the first step in this journey. Recruitment of additional team members to fill critical 
needs will follow. Involvement from the Environment, Health, Safety and Quality group is 
required. Additional support from the ranks of the senior management group would add 
credibility to the process. This group will provide guidance to the core and plant shutdown teams 
to ensure progress to defined goals. Once a shutdown management steering committee is formed 
this group can revert to its roles in that organization. 
An ideal opportunity for this group to meet would be in May following the April/May 
2011 major shutdown of #10 roaster. All of the major Trail shutdowns will have occurred in the 
preceding nine months, and the next major shutdown is planned to occur sixteen months later. 
This is clearly a time for reflection on results achieved, and an opportunity to build strength into 
major shutdown management practices. Prior to this shutdown, it would be worthwhile for the 
roaster shutdown team to receive training in preparing effective shutdown post mortems to 
maximize input into this process.  
4.3 Creating a Vision 
“In every successful transformation effort that I (Kotter) have seen, the guiding coalition 
develops a picture of the future that is relatively easy to communicate and appeals to customers, 
stockholders, and employees” (Kotter, 2007: 98). A current understanding of the vision for the 
group to work with is described below. 
Today‟s view of management shutdown management considers this activity as a 
necessary, and expensive, cost of doing business. Let us turn that around and look at how we add 
value by effectively managing shutdowns, not only to prevent harm to individuals and the 
environment, but instead to add value to plant operations. “Turnaround management” likely 
provides a better descriptor of the desired result. The vision must consider improvements to plant 
operating performance including on-line time and/or operating rate, extending the duration of the 
operating campaign between shutdowns, as well as reducing costs and downtime required to 
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complete the turnaround. The core shutdown team participates in working towards these goals by 
effective management of the shutdown planning, execution and follows up processes.  
The plant business area participates in this process by setting appropriate and clear 
operating goals. This process has been particularly effective in the smelter where the furnace 
integrity group has set a goal of achieving a four year operating campaign between shutdowns. 
The roaster group needs to evaluate the potential opportunity to establish integrity teams to 
improve operating results and shutdown performance. The SGH plants represent an ideal area to 
implement this concept. 
4.4 Communicating the Vision 
Communicating a vision for the future is particularly challenging. … “Communication 
comes in both words and deeds, and the latter are often the most powerful form” (Kotter, 2007: 
100). 
The best approach to communicating the vision for improved shutdown management is to 
link actions with the vision. The Operating Manager, Lead Smelter Operations has a clear vision 
for improved shutdown management in his area. This individual transferred to the smelter area in 
2010 a few months prior to the 2010 major shutdown. He recognized that there was not an overall 
post mortem completed following the 2007 shutdown. He initiated necessary activities to develop 
a pseudo post mortem for the 2007 shutdown and ensured implementation of necessary follow up 
actions. He provided necessary leadership to ensure completion of project specific and overall 
shutdown post mortems following the 2010 shutdown. He has strongly influenced activities 
necessary to have a defined strategy for follow-up. 
Similarly, the roaster organization could establish an integrity group to monitor and 
manage process equipment condition. The SGH plants are an ideal place to begin this process. 
The 2009 condition based assessment of all major equipment in SGH is a useful starting point for 
future inspections and repairs. The acid plant renewal project will benefit from this approach, as 
the future commissioning teams define the path forward for managing equipment condition. It is 
essential to communicate this linkage to future shutdown practices. 
The roaster and smelter shutdown teams need to establish a closer working relationship to 
enable cross learning to occur more quickly, and become an unofficial core shutdown team. This 
team should include the front-end engineers at the roasters and the smelter, shutdown 
coordinators of both areas, and the smelter shutdown manager. The proposed team will meet on a 
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regular basis to share experiences from previous shutdowns, upcoming challenges and common 
issues. An important goal will be to establish a common approach to the shutdown planning and 
execution strategy would develop based on best practice arising from both areas. As the teams 
begin to closer working relationships, it could well be that the two teams become one team in 
practice. 
4.5 Empowering Others to Act on the Vision 
“To some degree, a guiding coalition empowers others to act simply by successfully 
communicating the new direction. But communication is never sufficient by itself. Renewal also 
requires the removal of obstacles” (Kotter, 2007: 101). 
Current shutdown performance measures focus on the shutdown outcomes. Specific 
measures used include workplace safety results, environmental incidents, and completing the 
work on time and on budget. The shutdown management team, plant management and senior 
management review these measures but outside this group, this information is not known except 
in situations when a major problem arises.  
It would be worthwhile to develop additional measures that relate to the effect individuals 
can have on a shutdown. For example, measures such as savings on procurement and contractor 
efficiency are measures that individuals can understand and find ways to achieve improved 
performance. Linking these measures to shutdown planning activities and to changes in use of 
infrastructure issues will provide regular opportunities to share the vision, and identify constraints 
or obstacles to improved performance.  
It is important that there be routine discussions of these measures and the impact of 
individual action of group performance. Discussions should recognize contributions made to 
achieve improved performance. For example, improved integration of procurement in the 
shutdown planning process for the smelter has resulted in significant cost reductions. Sharing the 
impact of these changes will help others to determine additional approaches to improved 
performance. 
4.6 Planning for and Creating Short Term Wins 
“Real transformation takes time, and a renewal effort risks losing momentum if there are no short 
term goals to meet and celebrate” (Kotter, 2007: 102). 
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It is estimated by the author that total cost savings achieved in the last shutdown by effective 
integration of purchasing into the smelter shutdown planning process were in the range of $1-2 
million, of a total $37.3 million expended. It is suggested that a simple method of estimating 
these savings during the next shutdown be devised, and the results widely communicated on 
Tadanet. Identification and recognition of this result, and the contributions made by the shutdown 
management team, front-end engineering staff and the purchasing will encourage others to follow 
suit. Similarly, identification and communication of the results achieved benefits achieved by the 
established integrity groups, and the recently implemented quality assurance protocols in the 
smelter are positive examples for other business areas to follow and achieve improved results. 
4.7 Ongoing Steering Committee Responsibilities 
The shutdown steering committee will be a key driver for future change. As improvement 
demonstrate clear benefits to the smelter and roaster business areas, these changes will need to be 
recognized and then consolidated and institutionalized throughout Trail Operations. It is essential 
to anchor new shutdown processes in the culture (Kotter, 2007) of Trail Operations. A critical 
risk for the steering committee to be aware of is to declare success too early (Kotter, 2007) and 
break up the steering committee. 
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5: Conclusion 
Major maintenance shutdown management is an important contributor to success of Trail 
Operations. The site has achieved significant improvement in shutdown management over the 
past decade. Experience has demonstrated that any gap in shutdown management can be very 
costly in terms of worker life and quality of life, impact on our environment, production results 
from the operating plants, as well as the financial cost of the shutdown itself. Difficulties of the 
2010 shutdowns demonstrate that we have not yet achieved the standard that we expect of 
ourselves. 
Successful shutdown performance begins well before the actual shutdown event, and 
includes activities that continue well after the last contractor leaves the work site. There are four 
key components required to deliver best practice in shutdown project management at Trail. First, 
formal in-plant systems must be in place to monitor and manage condition of the major process 
equipment units. Second, the engineering and planning processes for every shutdown must begin 
as early as possible, and ensure full integration of required support groups such as the EH&S 
department, purchasing and contractors. Third, a strong shutdown management team working 
with robust systems is required to ensure contractors perform project work to plan, and to 
communicate necessary information to all participants in a timely manner. Fourth, follow up must 
take place following every shutdown to ensure that there is a systematic and continuous process 
of improving shutdown management. 
Central management of standards and processes for the major Trail shutdowns is required 
to deliver improved and consistent results for the future. This is essential to ensuring the next 
generation will avoid the repeating failures of the past as members of the existing management 
team retire. This next generation will face sufficient challenges of its own to meet the demands 
for increasingly higher levels of performance, without needing to re-learning the lessons of the 
past. 
Two important full time positions at Trail are required to provide additional leadership in 
shutdown management. All of the business areas at Trail Operations have the potential to benefit 
by creating a new full time role of shutdown project manager for the current smelter shutdown 
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manager. Additionally, a full time shutdown EH&S manager is required to assist with improving 
management of shutdown environmental, health and safety aspects. 
The roaster business area will achieve significant improvement in shutdown planning 
activities by establishing process integrity teams. Early identification of shutdown projects will 
result from a strong focus on process equipment condition. The team will manage front-end 
engineering to schedule rather than heavily relying on individual effort. Furthermore, these teams 
will prove useful for transferring process equipment knowledge to more members of the roaster 
management team. As the teams mature, the shutdown team will realize significant improvement 
in shutdown execution due to the application of quality assurance protocols. 
A steering committee of management personnel is required to guide and direct the 
process of defining shutdown standards and processes for Trail Operations. This steering 
committee will develop a common vision and objectives for shutdown management at Trail. This 
committee will implement and oversee necessary change initiatives to improve shutdown 
management performance at Trail.  
Now is the time for implementing this change. There are potential synergies with some of 
the major projects about to start at Trail Operations. Furthermore, upcoming retirements will lead 
to a loss of significant experience that will make this change more difficult in the future. 
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